Income, expenditure and the living standards of UK households by Richard Blundell & Ian Preston
Fiscal Studies (1996) vol. 16, no. 3, pp.40-54
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1999
Income, Expenditure and the Living
Standards of UK Households
RICHARD BLUNDELL and IAN PRESTON
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the widespread use of income as a measure of household welfare, there
is much to recommend the use of consumption. Indeed, standard economic
arguments suggest that consumption expenditure will better reflect expected
lifetime resources and many economists have been unequivocal in advocating its
use. Slesnick (1993), for example, suggests that ‘From a theoretical perspective
it is more appropriate to evaluate poverty using a consumption based measure of
household welfare’. Cutler and Katz (1992) state that ‘Economic theory suggests
that permanent income or consumption is a more accurate measure of the
distribution of resources than is current income’. Poterba (1989) argues that `If
households base their spending plans on their expected lifetime income, then
consumption provides a more accurate measure of resources than does annual
income’.
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This is not an issue of solely theoretical interest. For example, there have
been widely referred-to and conflicting studies of household poverty that have in
some cases used consumption-based measures (e.g. Commission of the European
Communities, 1991) and in others income-based measures (e.g. Social Services
Select Committee, 1991). Slesnick, looking at the US, argues that `consumption
based poverty rates are much lower then those based on income’. Goodman and
Webb (1995), in a careful study of UK data, point out that ‘there are many
households throughout the population who are ranked differently by expenditure
than by income’.
In this paper, we seek to understand the reasons why income and
consumption can yield differing conclusions and what we can infer when
income-based and consumption-based measures of inequality and poverty move
differently. We argue that permanent differences in living standards will be
reflected in inequality of both consumption and income. However, variation in
household incomes also arises from short-run income variability. While growth
in consumption inequality may be indicative of growing permanent income
differences, growth in income inequality over and above this suggests an
additional increase in short-term income risk.
Drawing on our earlier work (Blundell and Preston, 1994), we  reach three
main conclusions regarding the changing distribution of living standards in the
UK over the last 20 years:
!  Consumption and income measures both point to strongly-increasing
inequality during the 1980s, though the rise in income inequality over this
period has been greater.
!  Measures of absolute poverty based on consumption have fallen over this
period.
!  In the later part of the 1980s, short-term income risk has increased alongside
increased permanent inequality.
II. MEASURING LIVING STANDARDS
We begin by reviewing some of the issues in choosing between income and
consumption. The use of income as a measure of household welfare is open to
the obvious criticism that current income may not reflect the longer-run level of
resources available to a household or an individual. If saving or borrowing is
possible, then the household is not constrained to a consumption path that
follows fluctuations in its path of incomes. Economic theories of the life cycle
suggest that the household will seek to smooth its consumption stream even
when its income stream is uneven. In such circumstances, we may expect
consumption expenditure to better reflect the household’s long-term
consumption opportunities. Even where households face constraints on theirFiscal Studies
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borrowing during ‘bad’ periods, this does not imply that consumption will be any
worse a measure of resources than income.
This basic argument offers a compelling case for preferring consumption
expenditure to income but should not lead us to assume that consumption is
without problems. The argument for consumption is most convincing when
comparing households of similar age and similar birth year. The sort of
comparisons for which we wish to use it, however, frequently involve those of
different age and different birth year, and such comparisons are less appealing
for a number of reasons.
Firstly, there are problems in using consumption to compare households at
different stages in their lives. Life-cycle theory does not necessarily suggest a
flat stream of consumption across the lifetime. The consumption of differently-
aged households may therefore differ even when their lifetime resources do not.
Demographic and other influences on preferences change over the lifetime. In
particular, tastes and needs can be expected to change with childbearing and
child-rearing, and consumption decisions are likely to reflect this. We can seek
to adjust the consumption of households at different stages in their demographic
history onto a comparable basis by use of equivalence scales (see, for instance,
Banks and Johnson (1994)). However, we have to recognise here that the
appropriate concept is a life-cycle consistent scale, which is to say one that
recognises that households adjust planned consumption streams in response to
anticipated arrival of children (Banks, Blundell and Preston, 1994). Labour
market status is another influence on preferences and, if some consumption
expenditures reflect work-related costs (see, for example, Blundell, Browning
and Meghir (1994)), a change in consumption when an individual changes his or
her labour market status may not reflect any change in welfare.
Furthermore, positive real interest rates offer a financial return to delaying
spending, and households that are prepared to wait ought to take advantage.
Older households may have higher consumption than younger ones as a
consequence. On the other hand, if households are impatient, then they will
borrow against future earnings and the young may spend more than the old.
Consumption reflects lifetime welfare accurately when comparing those of
different ages only if these effects are absent or balance out.
Secondly, there are problems in using consumption to compare households
born in very different periods. If real interest rates are variable, then comparisons
of similarly-aged households in different years are rendered suspect by the
difference in interest rate histories that the households will have faced.
Households with similar lifetime resources but born in different years may
choose different spending paths because they face different intertemporal
substitution possibilities. The validity of comparisons in such a context can be
shown to depend both on the extent of households’ willingness to forgo
consumption in one period to increase it in another and on the degree of
variability in interest rates.Income, Expenditure and Living Standards
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These sorts of problems are all discussed at greater depth in Blundell and
Preston (1994). None of these arguments offers reasons to prefer income, against
which equally pertinent points could be made, but they do suggest some caution
in interpreting results using consumption.
There is a further aspect to living standards that merits consideration. Much
variation in income is unanticipated and this income risk makes households
worse off. Families would be as well off with a lower expected income without
the risk, and the amount that expected income could be reduced is a measure of
the cost to them. While this cost cannot be captured by their income, the
uncertainty should encourage precautionary saving which means that it will
depress their consumption.
2 The cost of increasing income risk is therefore
reflected in increased precautionary saving. This offers another argument for
looking sympathetically at the use of consumption.
In practice, the need to use expenditure as best available proxy for
consumption introduces problems largely associated with infrequency of
purchase for the more durable of consumption items. We may expect this to
introduce an element in the variance of expenditure which is not a genuine
reflection of variance in household living standards. However, if, as below, we
place emphasis on comparison of growth in inequality and poverty for different
groups rather than the cross-section level at any point in time, then, unless there




The data used here are drawn from the 1970–92 UK Family Expenditure
Surveys; full details are given in the data appendix. In each year, we calculate
measures of inequality and poverty for the whole sample but also for subsamples
formed by grouping individuals according to 10-year bands for date of birth of
the head of household. This allows us to follow the path of inequality and
poverty within particular ‘cohorts’ as they pass through stages of the life cycle.
Inequality is captured using the well-known Atkinson (1970) inequality
index.
4 Figure 1 shows the evolution of inequality calculated across the whole
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The dotted lines in this and subsequent pictures mark confidence bands of two standard errors either side of the
difference. The expenditure- and income-based statistics are clearly not independent, being calculated from the
same sample. Our calculation of standard errors for the differences takes account of this. We avoid putting on
further confidence bands to avoid cluttering the diagram.
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FIGURE 2
Atkinson Index within Cohort, by Year, 1970–92
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sample over the whole 22-year period considered. It is clear that inequality has
risen, measured in either way. Expenditure-based inequality has moved
continually upward, dipping slightly only in the last few years. Income-based
inequality followed a rather flatter path over the 1970s, rising steeply only in the
latter half of the period. The consequence is a clearly humped path for the
difference between the two measures, with income inequality rising noticeably
more quickly in the 1980s.
5
Figure 2 draws similar pictures for four date-of-birth cohorts. In each of these
graphs, we are following inequality between households all of whose heads were
born in similar years. For all four cohorts, we note that inequality has been rising
over time, however measured. For each of the three cohorts born after 1930, we
see also, as with the aggregate values, that inequality of incomes increased
noticeably faster than that of expenditure, and particularly so in the 1980s. The
differing picture for those born in the 1920s may be concerned with the fact that
they were entering retirement during this period.
With this sort of cohort breakdown, it is also possible to compare inequality
within each cohort with the level of inequality that characterised older cohorts at
a similar age. To do this note that, for example, the average age in 1990 of those
born in 1930–39 is roughly the same as was the average age in 1980 of those
born in 1920–29. The results of making such a comparison are striking.
6
Whether income or expenditure is used for measurement, all cohorts below
retirement age appeared to be facing considerably greater inequality at the end of
the period than had preceding cohorts at a similar age. This sort of cross-cohort
comparison seems to present a very strong sense in which it can be said that
inequality is increasing and that younger cohorts are facing greater inequality.
IV. POVERTY
We measure poverty by the mean proportional shortfall from a household
poverty line given by £100 per week in 1992 prices.
7 The theoretical advantages
of a shortfall index over simply counting the proportion below the line are well
known (see Sen (1976)). These include sensitivity to depth of poverty of those
below the line and greater robustness to choice of poverty line when
distributions cross at the lower end.
8
                                                                                                                                   
5 Goodman and Webb (1995) also find income inequality growing faster than expenditure inequality in the
1980s.
6 For a diagrammatic presentation of such comparisons, see Blundell and Preston (1994).
7 This is slightly less than half mean equivalised income and slightly more than income support entitlement
(excluding housing benefit) for, say, a retired couple.
8 The index takes the average across the whole population of the difference between the household’s living
standard and the chosen poverty line, truncating the difference from below at zero. The measure is expressed




Source: Blundell and Preston, 1994.
Looking first at the measures for the whole sample as presented in Figure 3,
we note that the shortfall in both incomes and expenditures has fallen but that the
decline in the income shortfall was concentrated in the 1970s whereas that for
expenditures by contrast came mainly in the 1980s. The consequence is a













Shortfall within Cohort, by Year, 1970–92
Source: Blundell and Preston, 1994.Income, Expenditure and Living Standards
49
We can again look at individual cohorts and do so in Figure 4. The picture
here is a less clear-cut one though we note that the picture of flat or declining
expenditure-based poverty and flat or rising income-based poverty in the 1980s
does at least seem borne out by the three younger cohorts pictured. Cross-cohort
comparisons also reveal an interesting divergence. For most cohorts, the income-
based shortfall at the end of the period appears higher whereas the expenditure-
based shortfall appears lower than for previous cohorts at a similar age, at least
for households below retirement age.
9
V. SHORT-TERM INCOME RISK AND PERMANENT INEQUALITY
Cross-sectional variation in incomes can be generated both by permanent income
differences and by short-term variability. It is important to distinguish the two. If
an increase in the cross-section variance of income merely reflects an increase in
uncertainty, then, as pointed out above, this will clearly have welfare costs to
risk-averse consumers but it does not reflect an increase in permanent individual
inequality. Uncertainty concerned with unexpected transitory shifts in income is
very different from the inequality associated with permanent differences in the
position of individuals in the income distribution. Growth in cross-section
measures of income inequality or poverty alone cannot distinguish between these
two phenomena.
We take a simple permanent income model of consumption (see Friedman
(1957) and Deaton (1992)) to show how comparison of the variances of income
and consumption within cohorts can help separate the causes of growing income
inequality. The model developed will be crude in its treatment of savings
decisions, omitting, for instance, any role for intertemporal substitution
responses to interest rates or for precautionary saving, but yields general
intuitions that can be shown to carry over to more general models (see Blundell
and Preston (1994)). The intuition is that although the cross-section variance in
income treats permanent and transitory components equally, consumption
responds only to the permanent value of any income shock. As a consequence,
the difference between the growth rates of income and consumption inequality is
indicative of changes in short-term income risk.
To be more formal, suppose income, yit, of the ith individual in a particular
cohort in period t consists of a permanent part, yit
P, and a transitory part, "it. The
permanent part is taken to follow a process
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where &i is an income shock that is permanent in the sense that it is incorporated
into yit
P and its effect therefore persists for all future periods.
The individual is taken to choose a consumption level, cit, that deviates from
permanent income, yit
P (which is the expected level of its income in any future
period), by a transitory consumption component ’it. All three disturbance terms,
"it, &it and ’it are assumed serially uncorrelated.
Noting that we can write the processes for income and consumption as
and
allows us to derive expressions for the growth in cross-section variances within
the cohort. These can be shown to follow
and
Note that if variances of the transitory components are unchanging, then
variances of both income and consumption within the cohort grow with age at a
similar rate due simply to cumulation of permanent shocks (see Deaton and
Paxson (1994) for a similar point). Evidence of growing permanent inequality
((Vart (&) > 0) would transpire in an acceleration rather than simply an increase
of inequality within cohorts.
10
However, if the variances of income and consumption grow at different rates,
then the difference is indicative of something that must be happening to the
transitory components, since
                                                                                                                                   
10 Note though that this cannot explain growth over time in aggregate inequality of the sort noted in the
empirical results above. The death of older cohorts and replacement by younger ones would keep the aggregate
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FIGURE 5
Variance within Cohort, by Year, 1970–92
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Assuming the variance of transitory consumption is stable ((Vart(’) = 0), we
can regard a faster growth rate in the variance of income as growing short-term
income uncertainty ((Vart(") > 0).
This is an argument of considerable intuitive appeal. If economic theories are
right to suggest that consumption decisions are determined by the long-term
position of the household, then permanent growth in income differences will be
reflected directly in the consumption distribution in a way in which growth in
short-term risk will not.
Figure 5 presents within-cohort changes over time in the variance of income
and expenditure for the four date-of-birth cohorts. Within-cohort income and
expenditure variances increase with age as predicted, but an acceleration in
income inequality does also indeed seem to be present — there appears to be a
noticeably faster rate of increase across the 1980s than across the 1970s. Using
the arguments presented above, this suggests growing cross-sectional variance in
permanent income shocks. Moreover, the results point, as with the Atkinson
inequality measures, to a widening gap between consumption- and income-based
measures towards the end of the period. This is what we argued should be
expected if there is also growing short-term uncertainty in incomes alongside the
growth in permanent inequality.
A distinction between short-term risk and permanent inequality is also helpful
in understanding the poverty figures presented in the previous section. It may be
that short-term low-income spells could be taking household incomes in younger
cohorts more often below the poverty line even though their permanent shortfall,
as indicated by expenditures, has been falling.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Inequality in both incomes and expenditures has been growing over the last 20
years. This is particularly so in the 1980s, when income inequality was growing
more rapidly than expenditure inequality. Evidence of this growth can be seen
not just in the aggregate but also in individual date-of-birth cohorts, particularly
those still below retirement age. We argue that the faster growth in inequality of
incomes is evidence that there is both growing permanent inequality and growing
short-term income risk. Furthermore, comparisons between cohorts show that
younger cohorts are facing markedly greater inequality than did older cohorts at
the same age. We also find, at least for younger cohorts, that whereas measures
of poverty based on expenditures have typically fallen in the 1980s, measures
based on incomes have changed little or risen.Income, Expenditure and Living Standards
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DATA APPENDIX
The data used here are from the 1970–92 UK Family Expenditure Surveys.
Expenditure, for our purposes, is household expenditure on goods (including
durables) other than housing. Income is household current net income net of
housing costs. Expenditure and income of different family types are adjusted
onto a comparable basis using the adult equivalence scales based on
McClements (1977) and favoured by the UK Department of Social Security.
They are expressed in 1992 pounds and the base is a childless couple. The fact
that we deduct housing costs requires some justification. It makes sense in the
present context for a number of reasons. For one thing, it would be necessary
otherwise to construct some imputed measure of housing expenditure for owner-
occupiers. One might also be uneasy as to the extent to which regional
differences in housing expenditure could be taken to reflect welfare-relevant
differences in the quality of housing services purchased, particularly amongst the
poor (though we recognise that this is true to varying extents of other goods too).
For a detailed consideration of the issues involved in treatment of housing costs,
see Johnson and Webb (1991). We remove the households with the highest 10
incomes and expenditures in each year so as to enhance robustness of the results.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, A. (1970), ‘On the measurement of inequality’, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 2, pp.
244–63.
Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Preston, I. (1994), ‘Life-cycle expenditure allocations and the
consumption costs of children’, European Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 1391–410.
Blundell, R., Browning, M. and Meghir, C. (1994), ‘Consumer demand and the life-cycle
allocation of household expenditures’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61, pp. 57–80.
— and Preston, I. (1994), ‘Income or consumption in the measurement of inequality and poverty’,
Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper no.94/12.
Commission of the European Communities (1991), Final Report on the Second European Poverty
Programme, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Cutler, D. and Katz, L. (1992), ‘Rising inequality? Changes in the distribution of income and
consumption in the 1980’s’, American Economic Review, vol. 82, pp. 546–51.
Deaton, A. (1992), Understanding Consumption, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
— and Paxson, C. (1994), ‘Intertemporal choice and inequality’, Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 102, pp. 437–67.
Friedman, M. (1957), A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Goodman, A. and Webb, S. (1995), The Distribution of UK Household Expenditure 1979–92,
Commentary no. 49, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Johnson, P. and Webb, S. (1991), UK Poverty Statistics: A Comparative Study, Commentary no.
27, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
McClements, L. (1977), ‘Equivalence scales for children’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 8, pp.
191–210.Fiscal Studies
54
Poterba, J. (1989), ‘Lifetime incidence and the distributional burden of excise taxes’, American
Economic Review, vol. 79, pp. 325–30.
Sen, A. (1976), ‘Poverty: an ordinal approach to measurement’, Econometrica, vol. 44, pp. 219–
31.
Slesnick, D. (1993), ‘Gaining ground: poverty in the postwar United States’, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 101, pp. 1–38.
Social Services Select Committee (1991), Low Income Statistics: Households Below Average
Income Tables 1988, First Report 1990–91, London: HMSO.